Edward Jones argues that NATO must alter the dynamics for President Vladimir Putin, making the war too costly to continue, while Philip Mathias emphasizes that without a negotiated settlement, the ongoing loss of life and destruction will persist.
Simon Jenkins (Keir Starmer’s missile bravado could jeopardise Nato’s careful balancing act in Ukraine, 16 September) rightly points out that the West must tread cautiously in the Russia-Ukraine conflict to avoid further escalation. However, the article overlooks a crucial aspect of current policy: the prohibition on using British and American weapons against Russian territory.
Russia has exploited this policy, effectively turning its own territory into a protective shield provided by NATO. By enforcing these limits on Ukraine, Kyiv is prevented from striking back, while Russian forces continue to bombard Ukrainian cities from just across the border. Vladimir Putin is fully aware that under these conditions, a prolonged war of attrition will eventually favor Russia.
Simon is likely right in suggesting that altering these rules would provoke a retaliatory bombardment from Russia. However, such a response would be more of a temporary, symbolic gesture driven by anger rather than a move with long-term strategic value. Russia's capacity to sustain these bombings is already constrained by limited munitions, and a shift in NATO's policy wouldn't change this underlying resource issue.
What this policy shift would achieve, though, is to force Russia to pull its artillery back from the border or risk Ukraine targeting Moscow's actual weak points. This would allow Ukraine to exert pressure where Russia is truly vulnerable, rather than letting the conflict unfold on Russia’s terms. Over time, this could decrease the effectiveness of Russian artillery strikes, which have been a major feature of the war, rather than escalate them.
NATO must alter the situation for Putin so that the war's cost becomes unsustainable; otherwise, there is little chance of Russia engaging in meaningful negotiations for a lasting peace.
Simon Jenkins is right in suggesting that a decisive victory, where either Russia or Ukraine gains complete territorial control, is highly unlikely. Without a negotiated settlement, the war is bound to drag on for years, leading to further immense loss of life and destruction. Those who argue that negotiating now would resemble the failed appeasement of the 1930s should recognize that this comparison holds little weight—Russia is a nuclear power, and Putin’s political survival hinges on him being able to declare some form of success. While the idea of starting talks with Putin may be distasteful, it remains the least harmful option available.